The investigation revealed the following:

• The passage plan was not conducted as per the SMS, lacked substantial detail and was not updated when the vessel was delayed.

• No pre-arrival brief was held as required by the SMS despite being the vessel’s first arrival to the port.

• The 2nd Mate on watch relied almost exclusively on ECDIS for navigation contrary to the requirements of the SMS which required the use of paper charts as the primary navigation tool.

• The cadet was left to plot fixes on the paper chart and his work was never monitored. Had it been monitored, the vessel’s proximity to the hazard would have been noticed.

• The ECDIS safety contour had been appropriately set to 26 ft (8 m), but the alarm had been turned off as well as the “look ahead” feature and “predicted movement” feature.

• The Master allowed the entire bridge team to get distracted by other traffic without ensuring the vessel’s position was being monitored. Additionally, there was very little communication and coordination between the members of the bridge team.